Why a Taliban-style takeover of Somalia by Al-Shabaab is farfetched?

More than a year has passed since the Taliban’s swift takeover of Afghanistan. At the time, TV screens were full of chaotic scenes at Kabul airport showing desperate people scrambling to leave the country to escape Taliban rule. Outside Afghanistan, concerns that the Taliban’s victory will be copied by other Islamist groups in their countries of operation were widespread.

Like the Afghan government that was ousted by the Taliban, Somalia’s counter-insurgency efforts against Al-Shabab (and ISIS terrorists) heavily rely on international support. Somalia’s state-building process has also been foreign-led. International partners continue to pour millions of dollars into rebuilding the country’s institutions and training and equipping its security forces. Moreover, both Taliban and Al-Shabaab are jihadists fighting Western-backed governments. Both have ties to Al-Qaeda.

Geographically, both Taliban and Al-Shabaab operate in inhospitable terrains which are highly favorable to insurgents allowing them to hide and negate their adversaries’ advantages in conventional weaponry. The predominantly mountainous Afghanistan, for instance, presents precarious terrains for government and allies’ military operations enabling the Taliban to successfully resist counterinsurgency efforts.

For its part, Somalia is heavily forested in the south and is very mountainous in the northeastern Galgala region in Puntland state. These kinds of terrains offer Al-Shabaab networks of hideouts and training camps, as well as acting as launching pads for their guerrilla warfare.

Such similarities with Afghanistan made fears of a Taliban-style takeover of Somalia by Al-Shabaab very plausible.

Hence, some observers and policymakers have suggested that the Somali government should entertain the idea of negotiating with the Al-Shabaab insurgents especially as the mandate of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), formerly the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is set to end in 2024.

Al-Shabaab remains Somalia’s primary security threat. Following his election as President of Somalia on May 15, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made it clear that his administration is keen to take the war to al-Shabaab brushing off calls for negotiation at this stage saying he will only negotiate “at the right time”.

The group has in recent months intensified its attacks in the country and has even carried out rare incursions into Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State. It also controls swathes of land and extorts money from businesses in areas it controls as well as some parts of the capital Mogadishu. However, while fears of the group’s takeover of Somalia are valid, the possibility is farfetched. Here is why.

Globalist vs nationalist ideology

One fundamental difference between the Taliban and Al-Shabaab is that while the former strictly adheres to a nationalist agenda of ruling Afghanistan, the latter pursues a global agenda. Besides conducting attacks in neighboring countries, Al-Shabaab also has hundreds of foreign fighters of various nationalities within its ranks.

While both groups have ties to Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has openly pledged allegiance to the international jihadist network. In contrast, it is Al-Qaeda that has pledged allegiance to the Taliban, although the latter has never been publicly acknowledged.

It is easy to negotiate with a group that has a nationalist agenda as opposed to one with a global agenda. In other words, it is not the Somali government alone to decide whether to or not to negotiate with Al-Shabaab. It is also the decision of many other international actors particularly neighboring countries who see the group as posing a threat to their national security.

Moreover, it is also difficult for Al-Shabaab to win the support of the local population with its internationalist ideology.

Military power

Al-Shabaab does not possess the military power of the Taliban. Al-Shabaab consists of 5,000–10,000 fighters across Somalia which has a population of approximately 16 million people. On the other hand, the Taliban had a core strength of 60,000 fighters prior to its takeover of Afghanistan, with the support of other militia groups that could exceed 200,000. All this force for a population of fewer than 40 million people.

Moreover, the Taliban has previously ruled all over Afghanistan before the US invasion of the country in 2001 overthrew them. In contrast, Al-Shabaab’s operations have mainly been in the south and central Somalia and has never managed to take control of the country before.

Local support

In terms of demographics, the Taliban is predominantly made up of Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan which makes up more than 40 percent of the total population. This provides the Taliban with strong local support and a recruitment base. In addition, the jihadist group also forged alliances with militias and leaders of other ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and the predominantly Shia Hazara.

Conversely, Al-Shabaab does not enjoy significant local support and has been largely concentrated in rural areas where it exploits disenfranchised communities. In recent years, clan militias such as Macawiisley in the Hiiraan region and the Sufi militants Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaa in Galgadud have limited the group’s expansion of its rule and operations in those regions.

Semi-autonomous regions

Somalia’s semi-autonomous regions, particularly Somaliland and Puntland, have acted as buffer zones to Al-Shabaab expansion to take full control of the country. This was the case even before the country’s official adoption of federalism in 2012. This has not been the case for the Taliban since Afghanistan had a unitary system with the central government being the Taliban’s main rival. In other words, Somalia’s creation of federal states with their own security forces opens multiple battling fronts for Al-Shabaab overstretching the group’s military capacity.

Foreign backing

The Taliban has long enjoyed the strong military, financial and diplomatic backing of neighboring Pakistan during its military campaign. Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the then Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan hailed the Taliban for “breaking the chains of slavery.”

In contrast, countries neighboring Somalia have strongly opposed Al-Shabaab and have for close to two decades, militarily fought the group, mainly under AMISOM. Without foreign backing, Al-Shabaab’s aspirations to rule over Somalia will remain fanciful.

Taking all these discrepancies between the two groups and the conditions they operate in; it is superfluous to blow out of proportion the fear of a Taliban-style takeover of Somalia by Al-Shabaab.

This does not, however, negate the fact that Al-Shabaab is resurging and remains Somalia’s biggest security threat. Somali leaders, both at federal and state levels, should therefore cooperate and unite their efforts to defeat the terrorist group. International partners should continue to support Somalia in this regard.